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THE RELATION OF THEORIES OF JURISPRUDENCE
TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND LAW
ANTHONY D'AMATO

International law is studied these days in the real context of international politics,' but jurisprudence-or theories about law-tends
to be studied in a vacuum. Jurisprudence may be one step removed
from law itself, but does this mean that it is of purely theoretical interest? A political scientist has recently drawn a sharp distinction between "the most important aspect of the law-its operation in the
international environment" and "jurisprudence per se."2 Of course,
part of the reason for the seeming remoteness of jurisprudence is the
highly ramified and artificial atmosphere in which it is discussed by
some scholars. Glanville Williams has called the entire history of
jurisprudence a mere "verbal dispute," acknowledging however that
"it requires perhaps some temerity to suggest that a discussion carried
on over many generations has been wholly unreal." 3 Professor Ehrenzweig characterizes jurisprudence as a "tragedy of waste," a "Great
Name-calling," a battle between "truly great minds" fighting each
other "in seemingly hostile 'schools' of thought, storming the heavens
in their Tower of Babylon." 4 We might be somewhat skeptical of
Williams and Ehrenzweig, however, inasmuch as they are both legal
scholars with their own pet jurisprudential theories.5
In this essay we shall be concerned with the real world relevance of
theories of international law; that is, with the question of the theories
themselves as a factor in international decision-making. To do this it
is first necessary to review briefly the substance of the jurisprudential
debate among legal scholars, then to view some basic jurisprudential
ideas as factors in international views of "law," and finally to reach
*Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, A.B. 1958,
Cornell University; J.D. 196I, Harvard University; Ph. D. 1968, Columbia University.
'See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (1968).
2W. COPLIN, THE FuNGIIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vii (1966).
3Williams, InternationalLaw and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law",
22 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1945).
'Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalyticaljurisprudence:A Common Language for Babylon,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1331, 1332-33 (1965).
'Williams adopts a relativistic position, arguing that the classical writers were
merely attempting to stipulate definitions. Williams, supra note 3. Ehrenzweig
would substitute neo-Freudian terminology as the new language for jurisprudence;
his view of psychology, however, seems out of date by about thirty years. Ehrenzweig, supra note 4.
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the question of the operative difference a study of these theories might
make in world politics.
I. THE VIEWPOINT OF THE LEGAL SCHOLAR

Legal scholars have traditionally concerned themselves with discovering "the" meaning of law and the necessary preconditions for
its "validity." Classically this endeavor has led to the construction of
grandiose logical theories to which empirical instances of laws had to
conform at the expense of otherwise being declared invalid by the
theorist. To John Austin, for example, law is a command backed by
sanction; without these elements, an alleged rule of law is not "really"
law. Thus at one stroke he consigned all international law to the dustheap of "positive morality" since it did not conform to his domesticlaw model.6 To St. Thomas, law is the reflection of right reason; all
laws which do not conform, even if they happen to be commands
backed by sanction, are presumably invalid. Professor H.L.A. Hart
today would argue that if there is no "rule of recognition" enabling us
to distinguish laws from other standards of social conduct, there is no
"law."7 Not quite wanting to dismiss international law in the way
Austin did, Professor Hart argues that the international legal system
is "primitive" and hopefully on its way toward acquiring its own rule
of recognition.S And Professor Lon L. Fuller might rejoin that rules
of recognition are not enough: law is not "law" if it does not aspire
to regulate its own procedures for definition and promulgation according to standards of clarity, consistency, and even morality.9 The
counterparts of all these theories can be found in abundance in writings addressed specifically to international law, from the positivism of
Oppenheim and Kelsen to the naturalism of Lauterpacht and Brierly
to the eclecticism of Schwarzenberger and most of the American
scholars. 10
If we stand at some distance away from these theories, refusing to
be drawn in to the fascinating consideration of their intrinsic merits,
we may find that their existence is not at all irrelevant to our assessment of the function of law among nations, though the relevance may
J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 183. (5 th ed. 1885).
7H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961).

81 have attempted to criticize this approach in greater detail elsewhere. D'Amato,
The Neo-Positivist Concept of InternationalLaw, 59 AMt. J. INTL. 321 (1965).
'L. FuuER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-91 (1964).
10
See S. HOFFMANN; THE STATE OF WAR 88-122 (1965); D'Amato, The Inductive
Approach Revisted, 6 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 509 (1966) (on the theories of Schwarzenberger).
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be of a kind not thought of by the jurisprudential theorists themselves. First, we must disavow the basic premise of these theorists that
law has a discoverable single meaning. Any word, including the word
"law," carries with it a set of dictionary denotations (not al of which
are always logically consistent inter se) and a spectrum of usage connotations ranging from popular stereotypes to all kinds of questionable uses, and even misuses or witty uses (such as puns). Any attempt
by any writer to fasten upon a single meaning, or majority meaning,
or best meaning, of any word is likely only to add to the permissible
connotations and eventually denotations of the word (if the writer
becomes widely read).
Since it is a fact that some writers, particularly positivists such as
Austin and Hart, have had trouble with the term "law" in the phrase
"international law," we can conclude that for most people the term
"law" probably connotes domestic "laws"-those duly enacted by
legislatures or promulgated by dictators. Indeed, most people only
have experience with domestic laws; public international law is outside the ambit of their connotative acquaintance. It was only natural,
therefore, that some writers would seize upon the salient characteristics of domestic law, label that "real" law, and then proceed to call
international law fictitious since it lacks a central legislature or pervasive judicial system or other feaures of the law to which people are
accustomed.
We might, just for a moment and to demonstrate the relativity of
verbal behavior, imagine that the situation were reversed and that
international law was the everyday experience of most people while
domestic law was the rare occurrence. Then self-styled "positivists"
might arise who would proclaim that domestic law is merely "positive morality" since in order for it to be obeyed the state must use coercive police machinery, pervasive judicial systems with penalties for
disobedience, and enactment by the ritual of a legislature supposedly
representing the popular will. None of these are necessary for the
true international law, they might add; international law is obeyed
because it genuinely meets the interests of all concerned and fairly
represents the consensus of its subjects.
In the grade schools, we were all taught to "define our terms" before proceeding to use them in an essay. But it is precisely such an
attempt to define "law" that starts students of jurisprudence off on the
wrong foot. Rather, what we should do is to attempt to understand
the ways in which others use or even misuse the term. And even this
is not an end in itself, for we would like to proceed to discover what
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similarities of factorial constants attend the use of the term in varying contexts. And finally, our aim is to undertsand how these factors
convey structured sets of expectations from one context to another and
thus influence those who use the terms to communicate to one another.
Thus, with respect to international law, we should attempt to discover the connotative expectations engendered by -the use of the
term "law" primarily in the domestic context when the same term is
applied to intrastate relations. Of course, we are not interested solely
in the phrase "international law," but rather that phrase and all the
cognate terms and procedures associated with it. For it is not simply
the application of the single term "international law" to international relations that enables us to italk about legal concepts in the international arena; rather, an entire body of legal procedures, terminology, analogies, and the like are habitually used in diplomatic discourse and international claim-conflict situations. H.L.A. Hart has
correctly referred to the "range of principles, concepts, and methods
which are common to both municipal and international law, and make
the lawyers' technique freely transferable from the one to the other.""
Professor Chayes was appointed Legal Adviser to the Department
of State by President Kennedy even though Chayes had absolutely no
experience in international law. He obviously had no trouble adjusting to his new job, and turned in a widely-acclaimed performance.
Nearly all states have as their counsel in foreign affairs lawyers who
were educated in the states' domestic systems and who passed local
bar examinations, and it is only natural -to see these men using their
domestic legal concepts in international discourse. Any glance at a
collection of state papers will immediately reveal the proponderance
of legal terminology and argumentation used in international discourse-with, one might add, hardly ever a doubt raised as to whether
what is being discussed is really "law."
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL FACTORS AssoCIATED WITH "LAw"

Since we are not chasing after a single meaning for the term "law"
nor attempting to define for eternity the preconditions of legal validity, we are free to take account of all of the well-known jurisprudential theories as representative of what scholars have at different times
thought were necessary components of the concepts of legality. Although we are not directly interested in what the scholars themselves
thought, their theories are significant because they have been com"H. HART,

supra note 7, at 231.
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munciated to lawyers, statesmen, diplomatic representatives, and
others concerned with international politics in the educational process and through legal socialization.
One of the main jurisprudential ideas, though not amounting to
a "school" in itself, is the insistence that law is something that is
backed up by sanctions. Though the idea stems from Austin, it has
been most consistently applied to international law by Hans Kelsen.
In Kelsen's view, modalities of social and political influence accomplished by persausion, "setting a good example," or the promise of
reward, are all non-legal. Law comes into the picture only when a
"threat of evil", consisting of depriving the individual of life, freedom, property, or other values, is the basis of inducing the individual
to behave in the desired manner.' 2 It would appear that with such a
rigorous notion of "law," Kelsen would want to avoid the concept of
international law and stick to certain kinds of domestic law where
sanctions are easily pinpointed. Yet he does deal extensively with international law, not without a good deal of difficulty.
Kelsen would like, for example, to think of wars as the sanction for
illegal aggression, yet the "threat or use of force" itself has been outlawed by article 2, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. He
tries to meet this obstacle by arguing that the collective will of the
international community, acting through the Security Council, may
use force to combat aggression; article 2 only prohibited individual
states from doing so. Yet as Professor Robert W. Tucker, editor of
Kelsen's second edition, recognizes, the veto power in the Security
Council is an effective barrier to this reasoning, particularly when one
of the permanent members itself is guilty of aggression and uses its
veto to stop other states from interfering. Tucker's way out of this
quandary is to enlarge the inherent right of states to self-defense, but
before he is through the enlargement encompasses anticipatory selfdefense which in the nuclear age is hard to distinguish from preemptive aggression.13
Unless one counts himself among the devoted followers of Kelsen,
perhaps the best thing that can be said for Kelsen's single-track theory
is that it occasionally leads to brilliant briefs for a point of view. But
if we step outside the jurisprudential arena, we can recognize in Kelsen's theory the deep importance of having sanctions behind some
'2H. KESEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATMONAL LAW 4 (Tucker ed. 1966).
2Id. at 64-87 (new material added by Professor Robert W. Tucker). For a
succinct contrary view see Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary InternationalLaw, (1963) AM. Soc. INTL L. PROC. 147.
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laws. Unless some laws are occasionally enforced, respect for laws
might break down completely. 14 In the international arena, though
most of the laws are well-rooted in the self-interest of the states, it is
still important that some transgressions be punished and -that some
effective threats of sanctions be made in some situations.
To insist that an alleged legal rule is not "law" or not legally
"valid" unless it itself is backed by a threat of sanction, is to insist that
one connotation of the term "law" is the only possible one and that
everyone else who has used the term differently has been in error. But
in the domestic legal system, to pick the hardest example, "law" and
legal terminology are often used when there is no possibility of sanction. When the Supreme Court declared President Truman's seizure
of the steel mills unconstitutional, it had no means of enforcing its
decree. When the Court of Claims decides against the government in
favor of a private contractor, it too has no means at its disposal for
making Congress comply (and in approximately a dozen cases since the
Court of Claims was established, the government in fact did not
comply with the judgments against it).15 Yet everyone agrees that the
Court of Claims applies "the law," and that when the Supreme Court
handles constitutional issues its decisions have "legal validity."1 6
Or take even the paradigm of -the domestic legal system in the eyes
of positivists such as Austin and Holmes: the lowly criminal law proceeding. Here the positivists have looked at the law from the bad man's
point of law, and of course to him law is a collection of rules the
transgression of which entails varying probabilities of sanction. But
what happens when the criminal is cleared of the charges by a judge
or jury? If the police and the prosecutor are nevertheless convinced of
the criminal's guilt, what is the legal sanction that stops them from
punishing the criminal anyway? They represent, after all, the enforcement arm of the state, the dispensers of sanctions, and the reason they
typically refrain from punishing acquitted criminals is hard to relate
to a Kelsenian notion of threatened deprivations. Nor is it persuasive
to try to get around this by enlarging the notion of "sanction" to include displeasure of one's superiors, emnity of one's colleagues, or
hostile public opinion. Similarly unpersuasive is the analogue of this
in international law, where Kelsen at times appears to be suggesting
that "world public opinion" is a sanction that makes some kinds of
1'Cf. Deutsch, On the Concepts of Politics and Power, 21 J. INT'L AFF. 23,
233 (x967).
'1Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46
HARV. L. REv. 677, 685-86 n.63 (1933).
26R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969).
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international rules valid. For the adoption of this kind of argument in
the first place breaks down the initial distinction Kelsen made between persuasion and threat of evil; if an aroused public's anger at
the district attorney render other decisions he makes illegal (such as
"sanction," so too would all other instances of the public's anger at
the decision not to prosecute an alleged criminal whom he is convinced
is innocent). And, in the second place, the use of ideas such as "world
public opinion" for a legal sanction is tantamount to a tautology: the
public is upset because someone broke the law, and that in turn defines
what he did as law-breaking.
A second strand in jurisprudential reasoning is typified in Holmes'
dictum that "the prophecies of what the courts will do ...are what I
mean by the law."' 1 This too has a great surface appeal and has seemed
to many to be the sine qua non of any conceivable definition of legality. Of course, it is quite removed from the Austinian view of law as a
command issuing from a sovereign; Austin was thinking of legislatures
and kings whereas Justice Holmes was court-oriented. Holmes' answer
to this was that sovereigns can enact laws, but until the courts pass upon
their legality by enforcing them or refusing to enforce them, they have
not yet been proved to be true laws. But the difficulty with this view is
that while it may apply in large part in the United States, there are
many countries without a strong tradition of judicial review in which
sovereigns habitually pass laws and enforce them, and sometimes enforce them against the wishes of judges. To say that these are not
"laws" again is to deny the empirical basis of language and communications.
And even in the United States, a great many laws are made by administrative agencies and enforced by them, with only limited "judicial review" in rare instances. Additionally, Congress makes the "laws"
defining the jurisdiction of lower courts and a goodly portion of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction as well. Finally, although ,the courts get
to pass on the validity of some laws, the percentage of cases reaching
the courts out of the totality of law-applications is miniscule, and the
percentage of decisions against constitutionality is trivally small. The
great bulk of compliance with law, and the biggest portion of enforcement in cases of non-compliance, never get passed upon by courts. If
Holmes looks at what courts might do, his vision would take in only
a narrow portion of the legal activity going on in -the United States.
In international law, the situation is far more drastic. The International Court of Justice gets about one case per year out of the thous210. W. HoLMEs, The Path of the Law, in Co.LEcrD LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
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ands of claim-conflict situations that annually take place among states
in their international relations. Arbitral tribunals are occasionally
constituted, but these too account only for a tiny fraction of the legal
business. Nevertheless, many scholars and international jurists devote
the bulk of their efforts to a study of international tribunals or "case
law." They often plead that the jurisdiction of the World Court be
enlarged so that the rule of law may truly prevail. Typically they tend
to avoid studying the vast effect of the United Nations on international law, the proliferation of multilateral conventions and international agencies of all sorts, and the day-to-day bargaining of foreign
offices taking one side or the other in claim-conflict situations.
A somewhat related fallacy, though less harmful, is the position
taken by many scholars that one should think of international law as
something which a hypothetical court might decide if it were given
jurisdiction in an international dispute. The trouble here is that if a
court were given such jurisdiction, the dispute itself would probably
not have arisen in the way it did; the opposing contentions would
have initially been structured in a different manner in order to take
account of the presence of a judicial body capable of rendering an
authoritative judgment.
Nevertheless, the insistence by some scholars on the importance of
judicial activity in international law must not be overlooked. The
very presence of their theories in the jurisprudential debate signifies
the weight often attached to courts in any legal system. The mere presence of a World Court, even if its docket is singularly uncrowded, adds
authoritativeness to the entire legal system which nearly everyone calls
"international law."
A variation on the Holmesian view of law, which might constitute
a third strand in the literature of jurisprudence, was suggested by
Llewellyn in The Bramble Bush: "What officials do about disputes
is ...the law itself."' 8 By focusing on the broader term "officials,"
this view would encompass decisions by administrative agencies, legislators, arbitrators, kings, policemen, bureaucrats, embassy officials, and
so forth, including of course judges. Similarly, by adopting a sufficiently broad definition of the term "disputes" so that it would include
all instances where law is applied (i.e., potential disputes that are
avoided by compliance), the idea comes fairly close to encompassing
many of the denotations and connotations of the term "law" in public
discourse.
On the other hand, this single-factored view, like the others previously discussed, has its pitfalls. What if officials act illegally? They
29K.

LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9

(2d ed. 1951).
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may get away with it, but everyone would still say that their actions
were illegal - except Llewellyn, who would have to say that their
actions constitute "the law." If Llewellyn were to attempt to answer
this by adding the qualification, "law is what officials do when they act
legally," the statement would be a patent tautology. Yet something of
this tautology lurks in the original definition, for the term "officials"
seems to suggest lawfulness and authority. To this extent, of course,
Llewellyn's definition is devoid of informational content. Nevertheless,
it does convey an important psychological insight into the legal system-that officials by and large must themselves act legally if they are
to retain their authority.
Perhaps Professor McDougal may be classified within this third
jurisprudential position in his writings on international law. To him,
law is a "comprehensive process of authoritative decision."' 19 This is
an extremely appealing viewpoint insofar as the study of international
law is concerned, for it avoids the narrow emphasis on judge-made law
and enables scholars to view international law in a much more realistic perspective. Authoritative decision-makers, in McDougal's view,
clearly include "nation-state officials" who alternatively are claimants
on behalf of their own states and "decision-makers assessing the claims
of others."2 0 Surely their actions are an important datum of the content of international norms-the norms that are really applied in dayto-day conflict situations and not transcendental norms that may never
have been applied since Grotius, or that are only applied when and if
the World Court gets seised of a dispute.
Yet, if we take a closer look at McDougal's definition, we find in it
the same hidden tautology as the one just suggested with respect to
Llewellyn's "officials." The term "authoritative" decision in McDougal's definition tends to beg the question. What makes the decision
"authoritative" if not some prior conception of legality? Yet if there
is such a prior conception, then law cannot be defined as the "process
of authoritative decision." Of course, this would be just a harmless
semantic quibble if McDougal stopped here. But he goes on quite consistently, applying the tautology in all of his prolific writings on international law. The result is that his view of "law" becomes extremely broad, taking in apparently everything that nation-state officials do
(or at least, as Professor Falk has suggested, everything that non"McDougal, A Footnote, 57 Azi. J. INT'L L. 383 (1963).
20M. McDOUGAL et al, STUDIS IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 276 (ig6o). This is the
d~doublement fonctionnel idea of George Scelle.
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Soviet nation-state officials do21). McDougal delights in this breadth;
to him, policy and law are interchangable, and he would like to see
legal techniques applied in every aspect of foreign-policy decisionmaking. McDougal at times seems to recognize a distinction between
"classical" rules of international law and current policy alternatives,
but these classical rules, he says in a footnote, "exhaust their effective
power when they guide a decision-maker to relevant factors and indicate presumptive weightings." 22 Since it is unlikely that classical rules
of law will indicate any "relevant factors" that a decision-maker will
not already have thought of, these rules in McDougal's scheme become
just another set of alternative policy lines. This again is fully consistent with his view of international law, for it accords the lawyer a
central role in the making of policy. In an essay jointly authored with
Professor Lasswell, McDougal stated that "the lawyer is today, even
when not himself a maker of policy, the one indispensable adviser of
every responsible policy-maker of our society." 23 Since the identification of policy alternatives is a prime talent of the lawyer in McDougal's view, 24 it is little wonder that international law to McDougal is
just a collection of data that is part of the lawyer's equipment and
subject to changes in content according to the most recent policy decisions of nation-state officials.
The obvious reply to this view of "international law" is that it is
so broad as to destroy the concept of law as a restraint on the behavior
of decision-makers. McDougal might well reply that in his view there
is no such "international law" that effectively restrains decisionmakers from doing what they would do anyway, a position that accords
with that of the "realist" school in the political science of foreign
policy. But, again, it dashes with other people's views of "international law." Not everyone believes that national officials are totally
unrestrained in their policy choices, or that "law" does nothing more
than indicate to them some of a range of policy alternatives. And in
any event, such a thesis must be examined independently by a psychological study of the behavior of national officials. It certainly cannot be resolved by adopting an overly broad definition of "international law" when such a definition conflicts with many of the ideas and
concepts most people associated with the notion of "law."
Finally, a fourth line of reasoning in jurisprudence deserves our
attention, not only because it is one of the oldest approaches but also
'Falk, International Legal Order: Alwyn Y. Freeman vs. Myres S. McDougal,
59 Am. J. INT'L L. 66 (1965).
22M. McDoucAL, supra note 2o, at 887

'Id. at 49.
2id. at 58-91.

n.iog.

1970]

JURISPRUDENCEIN INTERNATIONAL LAW

267

because of its current vitality: the idea of "morality" in the law. This
is part of the natural law tradition-the "right reason" of St. Thomas,
the moral duties and prohibitions of the Stoics. 25 Extremists who take

this position-and this includes some street demonstrators in the
United States today-argue that any given law is invalid unless it coincides with the dictates of morality, that one's moral duty is to resist immoral "laws" for the latter are not really "laws."
More moderate is Professor Fuller, the leading representative of
the natural law school: if all the laws of a legal system violate moral
standards (as he attempts to define them), then they are not really
"laws" and the public need not obey any of them.26 On this issue

Fuller takes exception to Hart's view that the laws of the Nazi regime
were true "laws"; Hart would concede that they were laws and argue
that the people should resist them on the grounds of morality, while
Fuller argues that because of their secrecy, ambiguity, retrospective
application, and so forth, they were not really "laws" at all.2 7 Again,
this issue cannot be resolved by the stipulation of definitions; on the
particular question, one must resort to an empirical study of the way
the term "law" was used by the Germans and what they would have
responded if asked whether the Nazi laws were "true" laws. Of course
this is now, and probably was at the time, a non-researchable proposition. Yet the question is not simply one of semantics; a great deal can
turn on popular acceptation of rules as "legal" or "illegal."
Hart is not quite correct in arguing that people should accept commands of the central government as "law" even if they intend to resist them on moral grounds, 28 for to most people this would raise a
considerable barrier to resistance. The very fact that something is
"law" carries with it a good deal of moral pressure. An extreme example may be found in the lowly traffic ordinances: most people
would refrain from speeding on a totally deserted highway or going
through a red light in a deserted town at 4 a.m. on the ground that it
is not "right" to disobey these laws. Moreover, there are several laws
that many people think are immoral (laws protecting the freedom of
speech of Communists, or income taxation in the 7o% bracketi), but
these are nevertheless obeyed because "the law requires it."
In international law, it is hard to find many laws which are related
in one way or another to "morality." Most of the norms are of the
"ZA.D'ENTaRvEs, NATURAL LAW 20-21, 80-94 (1951).

21L. FUuLER, supra note 9, at S3-94.
-'Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 63o, 648-57 (1958).
2SHart, Legal and Moral Obligation,in A. MELDON, ESSAYS iN MORAL PmLosoPmY
(1958).
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traffic-ordinance variety. There are some which are claimed to be
"moral," such as the alleged rule against expropriation without compensation, but this is clearly morality of Western capitalist origin and
does not fully accord with the views of many states, as the United
States Supreme Court itself fully admitted. 29 However, there are
some rules which do intersect with substantive morality-the norm
prohibiting traffic in slaves (which was once quite the opposite, as the
Supreme Court once held 30), the rules against the use of poisonous
gases in warfare or the maltreatment of prisoners of war, and rules
ensuring the safety of diplomatic representatives, to mention some of
them. Moreover, the increasing trend toward the enactment of multilateral conventions setting up agencies to provide for international
social and economic welfare legislation, as well described by Professor
Coplin,31 may help to enhance the moral aura of international law in
general. Finally, it would be foolish of any international lawyer to
discount moral factors in arguing before international tribunals or
attempting to persuade opponent national officials; the appeal to
morality, while often insufficient if standing alone, usually enhances
the legitimacy and acceptibility of a legal presentation that is not
ioo% persuasive standing alone.
To summarize matters as they stand at this point, we have seen that
although it is not productive to force one's concept of law into any of
the four rigid molds discussed, each of them contributes to our understanding of international law and the way it operates in the international environment. The first idea, that of sanctions behind the law, reminds us that many people take a "bad man's" viewpoint in insisting
that no rule is binding unless it carries with it a threat of deprivation.
Any international procedure for strengthening the "sanction" element
of law may therefore contribute to the authoritativeness of the entire
legal system.
Second, we are reminded by the Holmesian view of law as a prediction of judicial behavior that an important element in the popular
idea of international law is the presence of international judicial tribunals. Even if such tribunals are denied the "big" cases, by increasing
their jurisdiction over "little" cases we may add to the authoritativeness of international law in the minds of the concerned national of'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1964); R. FALK,
(1964).
3OThe Antelope, 23 U.S. (0o Wheat.) 66 (1825). In this case Chief Justice Marshall
held that the slave trade, while contrary to natural law, was not a violation of
international law.
31W. COPLIN, suPra note 2, at 102-67.
THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
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ficials as well as the general public. The more judicial activity one
sees, the more "legal" a system may look if one is used to a domestic
legal system having a high incidence of court activity. Moreover, the
more "little" cases handled by tribunals, the more likely is the general impression that the smooth handling of little cases is preventing
many of them growing into big cases-or in other words that the "law"
is doing its job.
Third, Llewellyn's idea of law as the prediction of official behavior
finds an important spokesman in Professor McDougal, whose idea of
international law, though it may err on the side of breadth, at least
helps us recognize that the relevant actors in most cases are national
officials as they make claims and pass upon the claims of others, and
not the fifteen judges sitting at The Hague or the nonexistent central
legislators of the idealized world community of the "world peace
through world law" school.
Fourth, the natural-law school of the interconnection of law and
morals, which has found international-law spokesmen such as Brierly
and Lauterpacht, underlines the increased sense of validity of "law" if
some or many of the particular rules of law coincide with or reinforce
generally accepted standards of morality. To argue for a sharp distinction between law and morals, as some positivists (and "realists" in
political science) tend to do, is to take a position that conflicts with the
admittedly fuzzy and not entirely consistent concepts associated with
the idea of law and legal obligation in the minds of the actual members of legal systems.
III. WHAT OPERATIVE DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

If a study of theories of jurisprudence only yielded either a more
careful approach to terminology and definitions, or some prescriptions
that help increase the rule of international law in world affairs, it
would be of limited value in analyzing the current role of international
law in international relations. Thus it is necessary to proceed to a
consideration of the latter. In doing so, it will be seen that the preceding jurisprudential themes are vitally connected with the analysis
of the operative effect of international law.
International law, it may safely be said at the outset, is inseparable
from international politics conceived as the study of the influence and
control of national behavior. Professor Deutsch recently gave a general
definition of politics as the "more or less incomplete control of human
behavior through voluntary habits of compliance in combination with
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threats of probable enforcement."32 This is very close to a description
of international law. The latter is made up largely of voluntary state
habits of compliance, termed international customary law, in combination with threats of probable enforcement (usually the threats
predominate over the instances of actual enforcement). The result is a
loose international legal system, made up of rules, legal procedures of
doing things, standard legal ways of making international claims and
phrasing diplomatic notes, and a rough consensus as to permitted
modes of legal persuasion. Examples of the latter include the idea of
reciprocity, the strong deference given to opinions of the International
Court of Justice, and the roughly shared ideas of the limits to which a
state may go in acts of retorsion and reprisal.
Most of the substantive rules of the international legal system are
in the direct self-interest of the member states. The rules give great
deference to physical boundaries and borders, to vital security interests
of the states, to relatively easy intercommunication (via the laws of
diplomatic exchanges), to the minimal security of tourists and aliens,
and increasingly to the development of oceanic and outer space resources for the general welfare of all the states. Of course there are
specific instances of rules not in a certain state's interest: Japan, for
example, does not have a continental shelf and thus has been unhappy
with the rule that coastal states have the right of exploitation over
continental shelves. But although Japan would prefer a res communis
policy of the continental shelf, she has other state interests that are
secured by other rules of international law and has chosen to support
the rules as a whole by not objecting too strenuously to a particular
rule that she does not like.38
One could not begin to describe the nature of the international
political system without referring to the rules of international law
that stake out national jurisdictions and deal with situations where
opposing states have conflicts of claims over the same geographic area
or physical or human resource. Professor Coplin has well described
the function of international law as "an authoritative institution for
the communication and development of a consensus on the nature of
[international] society." 4 Previously, Professor McDougal had described international rules as serving the function of "communicat[ing] the
perspectives (demands, identifications, and expectations) of the
peoples of the world" about the prevention of unauthorized coercion
1Deutsch, supra note 14, at 232 (his italics).
"Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1969).
'W. COPLIN, supra note 2, at 8 .
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and the promotion of optimum order and welfare through the common exploitation of resources. 35 In short, one could not describe the
operation of power in the international environment without taking
into account the institutionalization of power as defined by the rules
of international law which lay down the jurisdictional competences of
states.
Yet simply to describe the international system by cataloguing
the rules of international law (and a number of other rules as well) is
only a first step toward the understanding of international patterns
of influence. The larger question is: can the laws be manipulated to
aid or thwart any given nation from increasing its proportion of political influence or allocation of world resources?
The question forces us to leave the security of pontifications in
books stating what the current rules of international law are, to proceed to a psychological investigation of the operative force of rules of
international law in the minds of the relevant world actors. International law is like any other law in that it must be conveyed to, and
understood by, those who are to be influenced by it. What counts is
not what some scholar in a book or article says the law "really is," but
what national decision-makers and their advisers think the law is. International law is a phenomenological datum at the national level.
We may safely assume that national decision-makers have various
stereotypes in their minds about what "law" is as well as various
opinions as to their own rights and duties under whatever laws they
feel themselves subject. It is also likely, though not always true, that
national decision-makers are primarily experienced in their own domestic legal system. As private citizens they are subject to traffic ordinances, laws defining the marital status, laws about the payment of
taxes, and so forth. Moreover, as government officials, they usually
perceive the importance of domestic law in securing their own jobs.
If officials subordinant to them obey their laws, then they are relatively
secure. If the public obeys the law, insurrection is less likely. One of
the ways they can help create an atmosphere of law-obedience is to
set an example in the way they behave-at least, in the way they behave publicly. By demonstrating a scrupulous regard for "the law",
they help condition others to obey them.3 0
When they, as their nation's representatives, enter into a dispute
with their counterparts from another nation, one of the first things
3McDougal, supra note ig, at 383.
3For a penetrating discussion of some of these issues see Fisher, Bringing Law
to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (1961). See generally Falk, New
Approaches to the Study of International Law, 6i Am. J. INT'L L. 477 (1967).
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they will ask their legal counsel is "Does international law say anything about this?" They will find that, in many disputes, international law has a great deal to say, though not always with clarity. But
strategically they will not stop at the question just posed; they will go
on to ask, "What do our opponents think international law says about
this?" For they will be concerned primarily with the latter question.
Their task, after all, is to persuade their opponents and win the dispute, not to be "true" to an abstract concept of international law.
Since they normally will not know exactly what their opponents
think international law has to say about the matter, they will probably reason that their opponents, like themselves, have a great stake
in abiding to law (at least publicly). They will also know, however,
that their opponents may draw the line between domestic law and international law; they will feel far less of a compulsion to obey the
latter. Nevertheless, their opponents, like themselves, may find it hard
to separate the two legal systems entirely. As Festinger has pointed out
generally, men tend to avoid the cognitive dissonance that results from
adopting contradictory positions with respect to the same phenome7
non.
But is "law" the same domestically as internationally? The answer,
a legal adviser might say, is that in some respects it is the same and
in some respects it is different. But it is called the same thing, and that
is an important "plus" on the side of similarity. Moreover, the lawyers' techniques that are used are essentially the same. The same
general principles of equity appear to apply, and the same use of
analogies and precedents that occur in domestic legal argumentation
are found in state papers and diplomatic negotiations. Thus, the national decision-maker may conclude that his opposite number feels a
certain pressure in the direction of conforming with the relevant international rule. This pressure of course does not tell the whole story;
the opponent decision-maker may ignore the pressure and decide
otherwise. But nevertheless the pressure is a factor to be taken into
account, and in the absence of other information, a very important
factor.
The importance of the pressure felt by national decision-makers to
conform to international rules appears to have increased in a steady
progression since the nineteenth century. This does not mean that
OIL. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). I have attempted
to deal with the general question of the consistency of mental constructs at greater
length in D'Amato, Psychological Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction, ii
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 294 (1967).
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there have not been flagrant violations; but looking simply at the
exceptions does not convey a true picture. International transactions,
after all, have increased with the advance of transportation, communication, and the number of states in the international arena. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons has in recent times made it especially important that a nation appear not to be upsetting the status
quo. (Domestic governments may be upset, but international events
since the second world war have been remarkably stable. Most state
boundaries, for example, have remained relatively the same.)
But the international status quo is itself a function of the relevant
international rules defining jurisdictional competences of states. Thus
a nation may appear to be an upholder of the status quo when it
wraps itself in international legality, while the nation that appears to
transgress international norms may appear to be the innovator. Since
innovation can lead to escalatory exchanges, there is great pressure
not to be an innovator. Or, if a nation must force through an international change, it will at least attempt to clothe its actions in the
greatest possible coverings of international law.
Returning to our calculating national decision-maker, we can see
that he will put a high premium on possible ways to persuade his opposite number that his own course of action is the legal and hence
conservative one, that he is not asking for anything new but simply for
his existing rights under the law. He will attempt to place the burden
of explanation of innovation on the other side. In order to do this,
he must make several other strategic calculations. He has to try to
figure out what the other side really thinks the legal position is. Additionally, he has to try to figure out what the rest of the international
community thinks the relevant legal considerations are, since either
he or his opponent may sooner or later try to bring in outside help.
Next, he has to put some qualitative estimate on the force of the
particular international rule or rules that are relevant to the dispute.
Some rules, after all, are clear; others are vague; some are clear but
only recently established, while others are of a long and unquestioned
duration. And finally, he has to estimate the other side's appreciation
of the qualitative force of the rule, a task that is complex even if only
because the other side will be expected to argue that the rule is really
different or questionable. What he has to calculate is how much the
other side really believes in the position it is taking.
This simple statement of the strategic considerations involved
leads immediately to the observation that one side or the other will
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often consciously be taking a position that it knows departs more
from the relevant rule of international law than the other side's position. Then the question is, "Should we continue to press this point
when we have the poorer case?" The dangers involved in doing so indude the chance that third party states or neutral observers or the
General Assembly of the United Nations will sooner or later say that
the case is weaker than the opponent's. Another danger is that the
opponent state may attempt to use force -to back up its position, calculating that it is "in the right" and that its enemy is unreasonable.
(By the use of force, the entire spectrum of retorsions is included,
such as making things difficult for the other country's tourists, raising
tariffs, withdrawing support at the U.N., and so forth.) The state thus
insisting on an unreasonable or illegal position will then find itself
the subject of retaliation on other issues, and if it in turn attempts to
counter-retaliate the opponent state will say: "We only did it because
you took what was obviously an illegal position on the initial issue,
and so now we've 'gotten even'; if you now want to counter-retaliate,
we will counter-counter-retaliate."
Because states have so many opportunities for inflicting all kinds
of subtle degrees of harm on other states, we may conclude that the
ability to take a position that is closer to "international law" with
respect to any given dispute is itself a "plus" for the state taking that
position. It shifts the burden of innovation to the opponent state, and
if the opponent state goes ahead and innovates, the "law-abiding"
state may retaliate in a manner that does not appear to other states to
be escalatory but rather appears to be a fitting reprisal. This is not to
say that the "plus" engendered by legality is the most significant factor
in any given situation; often it is quite insignificant and cancelled by
other factors. Often, too, international law is ambiguous on the subject and either side has an equally persuasive case. (However, even if
the "law" itself is balanced, the abilities of the corresponding legal
counsel usually are widely disparate, a fact that has played more than
a small role in the successes the United States has achieved in the
United Nations at the expense of the Soviet Union.) Yet, because international law and legal techniques are the media for international
communications in most disputes, the legal factor seems always to be
present; it is usually the starting-point in the calculations of the
parties; and it often suffices to dispose of the issue, particularly in
minor disputes.
Whatever the importance of the legal factor, it is something that is
subject to a certain amount of intelligent manipulation; a nation can-
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not change the amount of tonnage of its natural resources, but it
might help restructure international expectations by changing international law. Of course it will attempt to "change" the law in any
given dispute by argumentation, but that does not always work and is
usually well understood by others as being "too late." It can participate in international codification conventions, other types of multilateral conventions, and in the work of the International Law Commission; the majority of states do as a matter of course.
More importantly, a nation should make its own strategic calculations whether it is in general better off because of international law or
worse off because of it. Some new nations may genuinely feel that international law is stacked against them, and therefore they should not
attempt to improve or strengthen it. On the other hand, a careful assessment of the pros and cons of existing rules of international law
may convince the most unlikely states that obeying it is in their national interest.
South Africa, for example, is the subject of numerous condemnatory resolutions in the United Nations; it is watching the spectacle of
what it feels are illegal mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia; it is continually attacked on legal grounds for its system of apartheid. Yet South Africa showed up in the World Court to contest the
mandate over South West Africa, and in almost all matters it has
adopted, internationally, a scrupulously correct attitude toward the
rule of law. 3s It is evident that South Africa feels that the basic rules of
international law giving sovereignty to all states, protecting the borders of all states against illegal aggression, and generally excluding
from the concern of international law things that go on wholly within
the boundaries of a state affecting its own citizens,39 protect the continued existence of the present regime in South Africa much more
than the slings and arrows of legal attacks on apartheid.
It is in general no cause for amazement that most if not all states
will perceive that the plusses of international law for them outweigh
the minusses. International law is the creation of states, designed for
their mutual self-interest. The people as a whole, or humanity in
general, have no effective counter-lobby, and therefore they have to
be content with the provisions of international law that help them
while helping their governments. If in certain instances, such as apart",I have elsewhere attempted to discuss South Africa's strategies with respect
to the South West Africa cases. D'Amato, Legal and Political Strategies of the
South West Africa Litigation, 4 LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 8 (1967).
m'The rules against genocide are an exception.
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heid, international law as a whole helps the government more than
the people, that is the price the people pay for the state system.
If a state concludes that it is better off under an international
legal system than being an international outlaw, it will undertake
studies for the purpose of discovering how to manipulate to its advantage rules in the present system. It will also undertake to get some
idea of the persuasiveness of rules on the decision-makers of other
states. For it will be to a state's great advantage if it can make a good
guess as to the persuasiveness of a legal position on an opponent and
on uninvolved states. Unless a shrewd guess is made, a state will lose
considerable bargaining advantage.
In all these calculations, national officials should take into account
the classic jurisprudential underpinnings of international legality.
The sanctions theory or the morality theory, for instance, may help a
state enhance its own case, or help it to change rules by reinforcing
desired ones along these lines and extinguishing others by withholding
moral approbation or contingents from the U.N. peacekeeping force.
More probably, an awareness of the jurisprudential arguments may
assist a national decision-maker in calculating the weight of a rule of
law as perceived by the opponent side. In such a calculation, one
might assess the various weights of the jurisprudential theories in the
domestic legal system of the opponent, and then relate these to the
international argument being made.
An easy example of this would be to see if the opponent state has
a domestic system that is characterized by a pervasive judiciary. If so,
one might stress in international argumentation the relevant decisions
of the World Court. (South Africa, for example, has a strong judicial
system, and the arguments that seemed to score the hardest against her
in the South West Africa Cases were those based on decisions of the
World Court; on the other hand, South Africa was singularly unimpressed by arguments on an analogy to international legislation that
would enhance the role of national decision-makers or the role of the
United Nations.) If the opponent state has little domestic experiences
with an independent judiciary, then one might stress internationally
the rules contained in codification conventions or the rules found in
some General Assembly resolutions. Similar examples could be adduced with respect to the role of moral arguments intersecting with
legal ones, or the insistence on a clear rule specifying sanctions in the
event of transgression.
Finally, if national decision-makers should make such calculations, we ought to analyze them as well. We should not view "law" as
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a specialized thing, far off to one side and containing weird rules of its
own. Rather, "law" is very close to being an expression of the attempt
by one person or state to influence another. Since it is a well-known
and often powerful force in this endeavor, we should adopt a multifactorial analysis of it. We should not say that something is or is not
"law;" rather, we should try to see how others use or manipulate the
term. We should not dismiss jurisprudential debates over the "meaning" of law as inconclusive; rather we should look at them to find empirical data as to some of the factors that enter into the multifactored concept of "law" and legal validity. Finally, in international
politics, we should be aware of the jurisprudential factors, among
others, since they enter into the persuasiveness of policies that are
couched in legal terminology. For it is clear that this kind of persausiveness is directly related to the game of influencing the behavior of
other states.

